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THE KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION’S DECISION
ON MICROSOFT’S TYING PRACTICE: THE SECONDBEST REMEDY FOR HARMED COMPETITORS
Sejin Kim†
Abstract: In the spring of 2006, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”)
imposed a fine of approximately thirty-one million dollars and a cease-and-desist order
against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) for bundling its Windows Media Service
(“WMS”), Windows Media Player (“WMP”), and Windows Messenger (“WM”) into its
personal computer operating system “Windows.” Specifically, the KFTC ordered
Microsoft to completely separate WMS from Windows and provide two different
versions of Windows: one bundled with WMP and WM and the other without these two
programs. It is also noteworthy that the KFTC required Microsoft to include the
“Media/Messenger Centre” in the bundled version to help users download competing
media players and instant messengers.
Yet, the KFTC’s requirement still seems imperfect because most end-users become
wedded to Microsoft’s application programs to which they are exposed first. Instead, the
KFTC could have imposed a “must-carry” obligation which requires installation of other
competing media players and messaging programs as the default in Windows. Among
various remedial options available, the must-carry requirement against Microsoft could
be the most effective way to give Windows users fully equal access to competing
products. But many practical difficulties, such as increased costs due to potential legal
and economic problems exist in providing such equal accessibility through the must-carry
option. Thus, the KFTC’s “Media/Messenger Center” requirement, which is expected to
create similar (but still not equal) accessibility as the must-carry obligation, was an
appropriate alternative as the next best option for the KFTC.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”), one of the biggest software
companies in the world, is recognized as the “Great White Whale” of
antitrust across the world, particularly in the U.S. and Europe. 1
Unfortunately, it could not stay away from the spear thrown by the Korean
government’s antitrust watchdog, the Korea Fair Trade Commission
(“KFTC”). On December 7, 2005, the KFTC reached a decision which
ordered both Microsoft and Microsoft Korea 2 to unbundle their tied
products, including Windows Media Player (“WMP”), from Windows
operating system (“Windows”), and imposed a fine of approximately thirty†
Juris Doctor expected in 2008, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang for his guidance and suggestions on this Comment. The
author would also like to thank the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their hard
work and commitment. Any errors or omissions are solely attributable to this author.
1
Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing
Entry Barriers?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 189, 197 (2005).
2
The Korean branch of Microsoft Corporation.

376

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 16 NO. 2

three billion won (equivalent to approximately thirty-one million U.S.
dollars) for the violation of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
(“MRFTA”).3 Microsoft appealed this decision, but the KFTC dismissed it
without merit on June 6, 2006. 4 Similarly, the European Commission
(“E.C.”) held that Microsoft violated the E.C. treaty by bundling WMP to
Windows.5 The KFTC’s decision is regarded as more stringent than that of
the E.C. because of the types of corrective measures imposed.6
The purpose of this Comment is to provide an in-depth inquiry into
the effectiveness of the KFTC’s corrective measures to remedy harms
caused to competitors by Microsoft’s illegal tying practices. Section II of
this comment introduces Korean antitrust laws and the functions of the
KFTC. Section III summarizes the structure of the KFTC’s decision and
application of antitrust laws. Section IV examines the effectiveness of the
remedies adopted by the E.C. and the U.S. that the KFTC considered in
forming its own remedial measures. Section V evaluates the KFTC’s current
remedies by examining and comparing several options that the KFTC could
have adopted.
This comment will cross-reference pertinent sections of the KFTC’s
decision translated into English by this author.
II.

THE MRFTA IS KOREA’S CORE ANTITRUST REGULATION

The MRFTA 7 is Korea’s core legislation designed exclusively to
govern competition law and policy. 8 The MRFTA has fourteen chapters,
seventy-one articles and some addenda. The Act encompasses every
3
마이크로소프트 코퍼레이션 및 한국마이크로소프트 유한회사의 시장지배적 지위남용행위
등에 대한 건 [In the Matter of the Abuse of Market Dominant Position of Microsoft Corporation and
Microsoft Korea ], (2002 경촉 0453, 2005 경촉 0375) [2002 Kyung-Chok 0453, 2005 Kyung-Chok 0375],
Korean Fair Trade Commission (2006) (S.Korea), available at http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/
case/20060217_9653.hwp [hereinafter Microsoft Decision]. In this article, I first provide an analysis of the
relevant legal and historical context of this case, followed by my translation of the decision. Here, I only
translated the “holding” section of the decision. The whole decision is 266 pages long in the original
language, 16 pages of which were dedicated to the holding.
4
마이크로소프트 코퍼레이션 및 한국 마이크로소프트 유한회사의 이의신청에 대한 건[In
the Matter of the Appeal from Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Korea], 2006 심이 1163 [Case No.
2006
Sim-Yi
1163]
(2006)
(S.Korea),
available
at
http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/case/
20060529181129449_.hwp.).
5
Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, Commission Decision of March 24, 2004, available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf [hereinafter Commission Decision].
6
Youngjin Jung & Seung-Wha Chang, Korea's Competition Law and Policies in Perspective, 26
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 687, 696 (2006).
7
독점규제 및 공정거래에 관한 법률[Monopoly Regualtion and Fair Trade Act], Statutes of
South Korea, Act No. 7796, (1961) (last amended on Dec. 29, 2005 ) (S. Korea).
8
Jung & Chang, supra note 6, at 696.
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traditional subject of competition law, including anti-competitive mergers,
cartels, monopolizations, resale price maintenances, and exclusive dealing
arrangements.9
The MRFTA is primarily enforced by government agencies, especially
the KFTC which functions as a quasi-judicial body operating under the
executive authority of the Prime Minister. 10 The KFTC consists of a
committee of nine commissioners (the decision-making body) and a
secretariat (a working body).11
The KFTC’s case proceedings are composed of two stages:
examination and deliberation. 12 The examination stage begins when a
competition law violation is reported.13 The KFTC begins the examination
process by investigating relevant documents, consulting with experts,
conducting legal reviews, and so forth. 14 If the examiner concludes that
legal measures are necessary, the KFTC’s commissioners begin review of
the reports, opinions, and other documents submitted by the examinees.15
The examinees may express their opinions directly or indirectly through
their respective legal counsels throughout the deliberation processes.16 If a
violation is duly recognized by the commissioners, the KFTC imposes
corrective measures such as cease-and-desist orders and fines.17 Once the
KFTC imposes corrective measures, the parties who are allegedly aggrieved
by the measures can file a private lawsuit in a court only after the KFTC
finalizes its proceedings.18
III.

THE KFTC DECISION HELD THAT MICROSOFT’S TYING PRACTICES
VIOLATED THE MRFTA

In a decision published on February 2006, the KFTC fined Microsoft
approximately thirty-one million dollars and required it to completely
separate WMS from Windows. 19 The KFTC also required Microsoft to
provide two separate versions of Windows: one bundled with WMP plus
WM and the other without those two programs.20 It is noteworthy that the
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id.
Id. at 109.
About KFTC, Korea Fair Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jung & Chang, supra note 6, at 710.
Microsoft Decision, supra note 3, at 12.
Id. at 3-4.
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bundled version had to contain the “Media/Messenger Centre” that helps
users download competing media players and instant messengers.21
A.

The KFTC Made Three Distinct Findings in its Microsoft Decision

In its decision, the KFTC reviewed three issues concerning
Microsoft’s illegal tying: 1) Microsoft’s practice of tying WMS to the
Windows, 2) Microsoft’s tie-in of WMP to Windows, and 3) Microsoft’s
practice of tying its instant messaging program, WM, to Windows.22 The
KFTC found that Microsoft’s practice of tying these three products to the
Windows operating system violated the MRFTA.23
The KFTC made three findings on Microsoft’s violation of MRFTA in
its decision. First, the KFTC found that Microsoft’s conduct “unreasonably
interfere[d] with the business activities of other enterprisers.”24 According
to the decision, its tie-in practices forced other enterprisers of similar
products to engage in trades and conduct that unfairly disadvantaged them.25
Second, the KFTC found that Microsoft “considerably harm[ed] the interests
of consumers.”26 The KFTC supported this finding by noting that Microsoft
1) raised the entry barrier to the media server program market, restricting
market competition and obstructing consumers’ welfare; 2) infringed upon
consumers’ right to choose media server programs (here, referring to medial
players and instant messengers); and 3) harmed consumers’ interests by
reducing technology development arising from decreased competition. 27
Lastly, the KFTC found that Microsoft “unfairly coerce[d] or induc[ed]
customers of competitors to deal with [it].”28 The KFTC’s decision indicates
that while Microsoft provided certain products to the counterpart
enterprisers, it forced them to buy its other products too. Thus, Microsoft’s
conduct was regarded as harmful to fair trade.29

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 5-6.
See generally Microsoft Decision, supra note 3.
Id. at 76, 157, 226-27.
See Microsoft Decision, supra note 3, at 76, 157, 226-27; MRFTA, supra note 7, at art. 3-2, § 1(1).
See Microsoft Decision, supra note 3, at 76, 157, 226-27; MRFTA, supra note 7, at art. 3-2, § 1(3).
See Microsoft Decision, supra note 3, at 76, 157, 226-27; MRFTA, supra note 7, at art. 3-2, § 1(5).
See Microsoft Decision, supra note 3, at 76, 157, 226-27.
Id.; MRFTA, supra note 7, at art. 23, § 1(3), art. 36, § 1(5).
Microsoft Decision, supra, note 3 at 76, 157, 226-27.
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The KFTC Imposed Corrective Measures and Surcharges Against
Microsoft

After finding that Microsoft violated the MRFTA, the KFTC imposed
fairly extensive penalties. Regarding the WMS, the KFTC ordered
Microsoft to unbundle WMS from Windows Server Operating System
within 180 days.30 Concerning WMP and WM, Microsoft was required to
provide two separate versions of Windows: one stripped of WMP/WM and
the other with newly installed “Media/Messenger Centre” that will contain
links to web-pages where users can download competing media players and
instant messengers. 31 For other versions of Windows already sold and
currently in use by consumers, Microsoft was required to provide the
“Media/Messenger Centre” through CDs or Internet updates.32 In addition
to these corrective measures, the KFTC imposed a total of 32.49 billion won
(approximately thirty-one million U.S. dollars) on both Microsoft
Corporation and Microsoft Korea Ltd.33
Microsoft’s tie-in practices of WMS and WM had never undergone
judicial examination prior to the KFTC’s review. 34 On the other hand,
Microsoft’s tying practice on WMP was examined by the KFTC just one
year after a similar case was decided by the European Commission (“E.C.”)
in 2004. A comparison of similar tying cases in the U.S. and the E.C. sheds
light on the effectiveness of the KFTC’s sanctions against Microsoft.
IV.

THE UNITED STATES’ AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S MICROSOFT
CASES REVEAL THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF CERTAIN REMEDIES

There have been many similar antitrust claims across the world
against Microsoft. 35 Although the scope of legal issues claimed against
Microsoft varies depending on the jurisdiction, courts in the U.S. and Europe
have commonly handled bundling issues relating to Windows. Yet, the
remedies imposed by the U.S. and the E.C. have both proven to be
ineffective for the harmed competitors of Microsoft as discussed below.

30
Holding of Microsoft Decision, art. 1, § A (translated by this author following this analysis)
[hereinafter “Holding”].
31
Holding at art. 2, §A; art. 2, § C(1).
32
Id. at art. 2, §D (1)-(3).
33
Id. at art. 8, §A.
34
박정원 MS, [Park Jung-Won], 사건에 대한 공정위 시정조치의 내용과 의의 [The Contents and
Implication of the KFTC’s remedy on the Microsoft Case], 경쟁저널 [COMPETITION JOURNAL], Vol. 125,
47 (2006) (S.Korea) [hereinafter Park Jung-Won].
35
See Picker supra note 1, at 197.
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Such ineffectiveness was considered by the KFTC in designing its own
measures.36
A.

The U.S. Court’s Settlement Decree on Antitrust Claims Against
Microsoft Failed to Alleviate Competitors’ Grievances

In 2000, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that
Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act 37 by tying middleware
products (including the Internet Explorer web-browser and WMP) to its own
Windows Operating System.38 The court ordered that Microsoft be split into
two companies, one for selling operating systems and the other for program
applications. 39 Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia remanded the issue of software packaging under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.40 The appellate court indicated that the tying arrangement
should be assessed under the “rule of reason” while the lower court held that
the practice was per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.41 On the
other hand, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that Microsoft
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by its illegal maintenance of a
monopoly in the market for personal computer operating systems.42
On remand, negotiations resumed between Microsoft and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and eventually led to a settlement agreement
between Microsoft and the government on November 2001. 43 The DOJ
agreed with all the essential parts of Microsoft’s proposal.44 With minor
modifications, the district court entered the settlement decree as the final
judgment.45
The final judgment neither required separate packaging (unbundling)
nor code removal from Windows. 46 However, the decree provided that
36

Park Jung-Won, supra note 34, at 47.
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 § 2, Pub.L. 101-588, § 4(b), 104 Stat. 2880 (1999) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004)).
38
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 253
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
39
Id. at 63-65.
40
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 84.
41
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 89-94 (The court indicated that it was not confident that bundling in
computer software markets had sufficiently negligible “redeeming virtue” as to warrant per se treatment.
Thus, on remand, the court directed the lower court to see whether the anticompetitive effects of the alleged
tying practice outweighed Microsoft’s claimed benefits.).
42
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 46, 52-54.
43
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2002).
44
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 63-65.
45
Id. at 202-03.
46
Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement; U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 59 Fed.
Reg. 42,845, 42855 (Aug. 19, 1994) (detailing the Proposed Final Judgment in U.S. v. Microsoft).
37
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Microsoft's licenses with original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) for
Windows not restrict the OEMs’ ability to install or display icons of nonMicrosoft middleware.47 The decree also allowed the OEMs to distribute,
promote, and launch the non-Microsoft middleware programs.48 Under such
a remedy, the OEMs could sell computers without visible access, such as
icons, to middleware (including WMP and Internet Explorer) and could
make other media players the default installation.49 However, it is notable
that the underlying code for the middleware would continue to remain on the
computers shipped and manufactured by the OEMs.50
Because this federal case was settled without judgment under the
standard required by the appellate court (“the rule of reason”), the consent
decree is not subject to the established remedial rule 51 of antitrust laws.
However, based on the fact that the appellate court did recognize the harms
caused by the tying practice in the browser market, the effectiveness of the
adopted decree can be evaluated by considering whether it cured the
recognized harms.
By making it possible for computer sellers to reduce the visibility of
software functions such as Internet Explorer, the settlement decree enhanced
the ability of browser competitors to install their software on the desktop.
However, the decree however, does not effectively alleviate the problems
relating to Microsoft’s tying practice. First, as critics pointed out, because
the decree allowed commingling Internet Explorer computer codes with
those of Windows, other competing products, such as Netscape Navigator,
barely survived. 52 OEMs had “little incentive to install competing
browsers”, and “developers would have no incentive to write software” that
47
Sue Ann Mota, Hide It or Unbundle It: a Comparison of The Antitrust Investigations Against
Microsoft in the U.S. and the E.U., 3 PIERCE L. REV. 183, 189 (2005). See also Wikipedia.com,
Middleware, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middleware#_note-0 (last visited Jan. 10, 2007) (“Middleware is
computer software that connects software components or applications. It is used most often to support
complex, distributed applications. It includes web servers, application servers, content management
systems, and similar tools that support application development and delivery. Middleware is especially
integral to modern information technology based on XML, SOAP, Web services, and service-oriented
architecture.”).
48
Sue Ann Mota, supra note 47, at 189 (citing N.Y. v. Microsoft Corp., 244 F.Supp. 2d at 184).
49
See Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (D.D.C. 2002).
50
See Commission Decision, ¶ 798 (“In particular, the U.S. Judgment does not provide for removal
of WMP code from the PC operating system.”); ¶ 828 (“Removal of end-users access does not restore the
choice of Microsoft’s customers as to whether to acquire Windows without WMP.”).
51
New York v. Microsoft Corporation, 224 F.Supp.2d 76, 96 (The remedial principle in the U.S. is
quite straightforward: the remedy should “unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct,” “terminate the
illegal monopoly,” “deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that there remain
no practices likely to result in monopolization in the future.”).
52
Mark Wigfield, Appeals Court Judges Differ on Microsoft Antitrust Issue, DOW JONES BUSINESS
NEWS, Nov. 4, 2003.
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was compatible with competing products because Microsoft had integrated
“more features into Windows.”53 Indeed, after the conclusion of the lawsuit,
Microsoft gained a monopoly share of the market for web browsers–which it
did not have at the time of the trial.54
A remedy that merely requires that icons be hidden but leaves the
intermingled source codes intact is not meaningful to other competitors. The
E.C. seemed to understand that a fundamental problem was caused by the
remaining software codes. In response, the E.C. required that Microsoft
produce an additional version of Windows from which such codes were
completely removed. Despite this additional measure, the E.C’s imposed
penalties did not fully correct the problem caused by Microsoft’s distribution
advantage in the software market.
B.

The E.C.’s Mandatory Versioning Was Not an Effective Remedy to
Correct Wrongs Caused by Microsoft’s Tying Practices

The E.C. found that Microsoft abused its dominant position in the
personal computer operating system industry in violation of Article 82 of the
European Commission Treaty. 55 Sun Microsystems, one of Microsoft’s
competitors in the server software markets, originally filed the complaint at
the end of 1998.56 The complaint focused on Microsoft’s refusal to supply
information needed for interoperability with Windows. 57 Also, the E.C.
began, on its own initiative, an investigation focusing on Microsoft’s tying
practice of WMP into Windows.58 On March 24, 2004, the E.C. rendered its
decision with corrective measures and fines. 59 In the decision, the E.C.
ordered Microsoft to disclose information that it refused to supply and allow
its use for the development of compatible products.60 Also, regarding tying
practices, the decision required Microsoft to provide a version of Windows
that does not include WMP.61 Thus, OEMs and consumers are left with the
53

Jube Shiver Jr., Microsoft Settlement Is Questioned; Appeals Court Judges Express Concern
About The Lack Of Competition Two Years After Antitrust Pact Was Struck, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003
(quoting Judge Kuney’s statement).
54
The EC Decision Against Microsoft: Windows on the World, Glass Houses, or Through the
Looking Glass?, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Sept. 2004, at 10, available at http://
www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/09-04/Sep04MSBB.pdf [hereinafter “Windows on the World”].
55
Commission Decision, art. 3 at 299 (“For the infringement referred to in Article 2, a fine of EUR
497,196,304 is imposed on Microsoft Corporation.”).
56
Id. ¶ 3.
57
Id.
58
Id. ¶ 5.
59
Id. at art. 2.
60
Id. at art. 5.
61
Id. at art. 6.
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choice between “the bundled version” of Windows and the “unbundled
version” of Windows.62 It should be noted that “the E.C. did not prevent
Microsoft from offering” Windows bundled with WMP, although the
decision asserted that “Microsoft must not circumvent the decision by
engaging in technical or economic tying.”63
There is no doubt that such “mandatory versioning” 64 is a stronger
remedy than the mere icon-hiding of the U.S. settlement decree. However, it
is unclear whether the E.C. remedy is truly strong enough to be effective in
achieving its purpose. For example, OEMs will not be given sufficient
incentive to purchase an unbundled version of Windows if it is priced
identically to, but not lower than, the bundled version.65 Indeed, Microsoft
said that it will sell the stripped-down Windows version (known as “Home
Edition N”) for the same price as its normal program.66 Subsequently, Dell
Incorporated and Hewlett-Packard Company, two of the world’s biggest
personal-computer manufactures, expressed their displeasure with the E.C.’s
order.67 Specifically, Dell said it did not plan to offer customers the version
of Windows that does not include WMP. 68 Similarly, Hewlett-Packard
Company stated that it expected minimal demand for the “N version” despite
its availability to consumers.69
Moreover, under the E.C. remedy, Microsoft is allowed to negotiate
with OEMs to have the bundled version installed on desktops.70 Under these
circumstances, other media players suffer relative disadvantage in
distributing their products because of the ubiquity of Windows. 71 With
WMP already installed on the system, an OEM will focus on the incremental
costs of adding a second media player.72 Indeed, such incremental costs,
which consist mostly of additional technical support and training costs, were
used by Microsoft as a barrier to entry against Netscape Navigator in the U.S
web-browser market. 73 In this way, other media player companies must
negotiate with the OEMs to install their products in the bundled version of
62

Id.
Oliver Sitar, The EU Microsoft Decision: Preserving Interoperability and Free Choice in Software
Markets, MR-INT, 2004 (vol 1), at 5.
64
Picker, supra note 1, at 203.
65
Windows on the World, supra note 54, at 10.
66
Josh Brown, EU's Microsoft Order Has Skeptics— Stripped-Down Windows Won't Be Offered by
Dell; H-P Sees Little Demand, THE WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2005.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Picker, supra note 1, at 203-04.
71
Id. at 203-05.
72
Id. at 204.
73
Id.
63
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Windows. 74 Such a deal increases the distribution payment of those
companies and worsens the under-distribution of other media players. 75
Therefore, the E.C.’s mandatory versioning is not practically effective to
eradicate the harms to Microsoft’s competitors caused by Microsoft’s illegal
tying practices.
V.

THE KFTC’S CURRENT REMEDY IS THE SECOND-BEST POLICY

In its decision against Microsoft, the KFTC followed a remedy similar
to the E.C’s mandatory versioning by requiring Microsoft to separately
produce another version of Windows from which the codes of WMP and
WM are completely removed. Also, it required Microsoft to create a
supplemental program in the bundled version to help end-users download
other competing products. Compared to the remedies adopted by other
courts, this measure seems to be a more effective approach to remedy the
violation and promote fair competition. The KFTC’s measure, however, is
still unlikely to completely eradicate the wrongs of Microsoft’s tying
practices.
A.

The KFTC’s Remedy Makes Remarkable Progress, but is Still
Imperfect

As briefly mentioned, the KFTC’s remedy is distinguishable from
other decisions announced by the U.S. and E.C. In regard to WMS, the
KFTC took a different direction than the E.C.’s mandatory versioning or the
icon-hiding remedy of the U.S. cases. The KFTC clearly ordered that
Microsoft unbundle WMS from Windows.76 While the U.S. decision only
required hiding the icons of the programs, the KFTC ordered Microsoft to
completely remove WMS’ codes from Windows. 77 Moreover, under the
KFTC’s decision, Microsoft cannot provide WMS with any version of
Windows. 78 For example, the KTFC strictly ordered that Microsoft not
distribute WMS in any other form, including as separate CD ROMs,
updates, download links or advertisements on Windows Operating System
74

Of course, the competing products may not be installed to the unbundled version without
Microsoft’s products.
75
Picker, supra note 1, at 205.
76
Holding, art. 1, § A.
77
Holding, art. 1, § A(1) (“The Commission will determine the range of source codes and files
which shall not be included so as to unbundle WMS from the Windows Server Operating System, within
60 days of the date of this order, taking into account the examinees’ opinions.”).
78
Id. at § B (“After 180 days of this order, the examinees shall sell and distribute WMS in a way
separate from Windows Sever Operating System . . .”).
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package.79 Such a complete separation is a stronger measure than the E.C.’s
mandatory versioning and is also the simplest way to root out the problems
of illegal tying.80
As to the WMP and WM, however, the KFTC adopted a remedy
similar to the E.C.’s mandatory versioning. The KFTC ordered that
Microsoft “shall not tie Windows Media Player . . . and Messenger . . . to the
Windows Personal Computer . . . Operating System . . . . However, apart
from foregoing remedies . . . . [Microsoft] may provide WMP
and . . . Messenger tied to PC Operating System as currently provided.” 81
More importantly, echoing the E.C.’s decision, the KFTC did not require
different pricing between the bundled and unbundled versions of Windows.
Thus, just as in the E.C.’s decision, this remedy is not likely to give OEMs
sufficient incentive to purchase an unbundled version. In other words, if the
unbundled version is provided at the same price as (or at least not lower
than) the bundled version, end-users and OEMs have little to no incentive to
buy the unbundled version.
The KFTC advocates that its remedy is distinguishable from that of
the E.C. because it requires separating WMP as well as WM.82 The KFTC
argues that many companies will prefer the unbundled version without the
instant messenger in order to enhance the company’s network security and
work efficiency.83 Also, taking the potential defects of mandatory versioning
into consideration, the KFTC required the bundled version to be equipped
with a certain supplemental device. That is, the KFTC ordered Microsoft to
“install and operate ‘Media Player Centre’ and ‘Messenger Centre’ in the
‘bundled PC Operating System,’” 84 through which Windows users can
easily download other competing products. The KFTC explained that such a
requirement guarantees equal opportunity for competitors as well as
consumers to choose the product they want, even in the bundled version.85
With regard to Microsoft’s new Windows Operating System, Windows Vista,
Microsoft was obligated to “provide devices . . . to readily download the
79

Id. at § B(1)-(4).
정영진, MS [Youngjin Jung], 사건의 국제 경쟁법적 의의 [The Implication of Microsoft Case in
International Competition Law], 경쟁저널 [COMPETITION JOURNAL], Vol. 125 at 63, Feb.-Mar. 2006 (S.
Korea) (the title translated by this author) [hereinafter, Youngjin Jung].
81
Holding, Art. 2, § A.
82
Park Jung-Won, supra note 34, at 45.
83
Id. at 47-48.
84
See Holding, art. 2, § C(1). It is also interesting to note that the KFTC ordered Microsoft to
provide service packs or updates which include those other competing products even to the users of
existing Windows PC operating systems, apart from the bundled/unbundled versions provided. See
Holding, art. 2, § D.
85
Park Jung-Won, supra note 34, at 46.
80
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streaming media players of other businesses which have their own formats
when providing the ‘bundled [version].’” 86 Certainly, through those
supplemental devices, other media players and messenger companies may be
able to alleviate their disadvantage in distribution. Unlike the E.C.’s remedy,
competitors can lower the additional costs for distribution since Microsoft’s
bundled version will guide users to readily download those competitors’
software.
However, it is likely that even though “Media Player/Messenger
Centre” will alleviate the under-distribution of other competing media
players and instant messaging products, Microsoft will continue to occupy
an advantageous position in distribution. When competing products are not
installed on Windows by default, the significant portion of consumers who
are already accustomed to the existing desktop environment organized with
WMP and WM are unlikely to download other competing products.87 As in
the browser market, “most consumers become wedded to the first products
to which they are exposed. . . . ” 88 In other words, any forms of “firstsighting” are “important market movers.”89 Therefore, the KFTC’s remedy
with the “Media/Messenger Centre” remains an imperfect measure. As
suggested below, the KFTC could have adopted better measures to curb
Microsoft’s monopoly and restore fair competition: a “must-carry” remedy.
B.

The KFTC Could Have Adopted a Must-Carry Measure

There was a wide range of remedies from which the KFTC could
choose in deciding the Microsoft case. There are three remedial options
which seem most applicable in this case: complete unbundling, mandatory
versioning, and a must-carry remedy. Among the three options, the mustcarry remedy is most likely to mitigate the disadvantage that Microsoft’s
competitors face in distributing their software as discussed below.
1.

Complete Unbundling

First, the KFTC could have adopted a narrow corrective measure to
simply require that end-users or OEMs be free to remove access to WMP
and WM while leaving the codes of those programs intact. The same
remedy was already used in the U.S. to remedy Microsoft’s practice of

86
87
88
89

Holding, art. 2, § C(2).
Youngjin Jung, supra note 80, at 65.
Charles A. James, The Real Microsoft Case and Settlement, 16 ANTITRUST 58, 59 (Fall, 2001).
Id. at 60.
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bundling Internet Explorer to Windows.90 As discussed above, however, this
measure has proven ineffective in alleviating the distribution disadvantage of
other competing web browsers. With this option, a similar problem will
occur in the market for media players. For example, Microsoft’s distribution
advantage91 incurred by the existence of the remaining software codes can
give content providers and software developers a strong incentive to use
media platforms based on WMP. 92 Therefore, the remedy will be more
effective if it requires Microsoft to remove the computer codes of the tied
products from the operating system. The KFTC adopted this option to
completely unbundle WMS from Windows Server Operating System. 93
However, such complete unbundling requires Microsoft to redesign its
software products, the codes of which are tightly commingled with
Windows. For this reason, the U.S. and E.C were reluctant to apply this
remedy to their cases. 94 The KFTC also seemed hesitant to take this
intrusive redesigning measure on every issue involved. 95
2.

Mandatory Versioning

Alternatively, the KFTC could mandate broader conduct relief. To
restore the market to a pre-bundling competitive condition, “an additional
affirmative remedy would be necessary to ‘kick-start’ the market into
competition.”96 This type of remedy could include “fencing in” remedies
such as a bundling prohibition under which Microsoft may be permitted to
bundle WMP only if it also offers a practical unbundled alternative.97 This
90

See Sue Ann Mota supra note 47, at 189; see also Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
Even in consideration of internet downloads, the evidence in E.C.’s Microsoft case suggests that
Microsoft still enjoys a powerful distributional advantage over its software competitors. In other words,
“Microsoft can easily make software present by just folding new software into Windows.” Picker, supra
note 1, at 199; See also Commission Decision, ¶ 842.
92
Youngjin Jung, supra note 80, at 63. See also Picker, supra note 1, at 203-04.
93
Holding, art. §1(A).
94
In New York v. Microsoft Corp., the court noted:
The case law is unwavering in the admonition that it is not a proper task for the Court to
undertake to redesign products. ‘Antitrust scholars have long recognized the undesirability of
having courts oversee product design’ . . . . Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs had presented
evidence sufficient to support their request that the Court require Microsoft to remove code
from its products, the Court would be appropriately reluctant to enter a remedy that requires
Microsoft to completely redesign its Windows products and places the Court in the role of
scrutinizing whether Microsoft has done so without degradation of the ultimate product.
224 F.Supp.2d 76, 158 (D.D.C., 2001) (internal citation omitted).
95
Picker supra note 1, at 203.
96
R. Craig Romaine & Steven C. Salop, Slap Their Wrists? Tie Their Hands? Slice Them into
Pieces? Alternative Remedies for Monopolization in the Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST ABA 15, 16-17
(1999).
97
Id. at 15
91
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broader conduct relief is found in the E.C.’s remedy of mandatory
versioning. But, as already pointed out, without creating a price gap
between the two versions, there is little incentive for the consumers to buy
the unbundled version in the relevant market.98 One might argue that such
mandatory versioning could be improved by mandating a substantial price
difference between the two versions. However, mandating such different
pricing is not an easy task: it is difficult to calculate the market price of the
tied products (here, WMP and WM) which are partly integrated into the
operating system, and generally provided without charging additional fees to
consumers.99 Accordingly, if the KFTC had adopted this remedy, it would
likely face the same problems that occurred in the E.C case.
3.

Must-Carry Remedy

In order to avoid the problems of the potential remedies above, the
KFTC could have adopted another available option. That is, a must-carry
remedy, under which Microsoft would have to install one or more competing
media players and messengers on the bundled version of Windows as the
default. Even though some argue that the “Media/Messenger Centre”
requirement has a similar function as the must-carry remedy, such a quasi
must-carry remedy is not as effective as a pure must-carry option in giving
end-users equal opportunities to use competing products. 100 Because
competing products are already installed as default under the pure mustcarry option, we can expect that the end-users will have natural chances to
use those competing programs at first sight. Accordingly, the must-carry
remedy would directly mitigate the current distribution advantage of
Microsoft by placing competing products at the same starting point with
WMP and WM.101 It would also lessen the market power that is exercised
by OEMs in the deals that they strike to distribute software.102
The core disadvantage of the must-carry option is the concern about
the selection of products which will be loaded to the tying product.103 This
was the one reason that a similar remedy was rejected in the U.S. case. 104
98

Brown, supra note 66.
Youngjin Jung, supra note 80, at 64.
100
See discussion, infra Part V.B.
101
Picker, supra note 1, at 205.
102
Id.
103
Id.; see also Willard K. Tom, Remedying the Irremediable: The Government’s Dilemma in the
Microsoft Case, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Nov. 2001, at 2, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/
11-01/dilemma.pdf.
104
See Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1239-40 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting the
statement from the Department of Justice to explain its decision not to pursue the States’ proposed Java
99
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But the KFTC could use an approval mechanism of the sort used in
divestiture orders in the U.S. 105 In order to ensure that the strong
competitors are carried and to limit the must-carry obligation to those
competitors, the approving authority such as a court and the KFTC could
rely on objective criteria such as market shares or the number of users.106
Indeed, the KFTC already set forth specific standards to select the
competing products that will be listed in the “Media/Messenger Centre.”
The decision specified the three categories of the standard: “the streaming
media players from the . . . businesses possessing the basic technology, icons
of messengers from businesses having more than five percent of market
shares in net users per month” and “icons of ‘Media Player Web Centre’ and
the ‘Messenger Web Centre’”. 107 Because such a definite standard was
already established, the KFTC could apply it to launch a pure must-carry
remedy. It would have been a better remedy for the KFTC to require
Microsoft to install every entry at default that will be included in the
“Media/Messenger Centre.”
C.

The KFTC’s Current “Media/Messenger Centre” Requirement Seems
to be the Second-Best Alternative

Although a pure must-carry remedy could be the most effective
measure as suggested above, the KFTC’s “Media/Messenger Centre” is the
second-best measure available since the economic interests of concerned
parties does not permit the pre-installation of competing products. In fact,
every concerned party seemed reluctant to accept the pure must-carry
measure. When designing the current remedy, the KFTC considered each
party’s costs and benefits involved in adopting the must-carry remedy.108 In
fact, the KFTC recognized that there would be some negative impacts on the
related parties by pre-installing competing software codes in the bundled
version of Windows.109 For example, if Microsoft carries competing media
players and instant messengers in its operating system, Microsoft will have
must-carry provision: “[I]t is not the proper role of the government to bless one competitor over others, or
one potential middleware platform over others.”).
105
Willard K Tom, supra note 105, at 3.
106
Id.
107
Holding, art. 2, § C(2)(a). See also Holding, art. 2, § C(1)(c) (“The examinees shall connect the
users to the said businesses or the Web Center’s websites so that the users can download desired programs,
when the users click on the icons of each program which appear following the clicks on Media/Messenger
Centre, or when the users click on the icons of Media/Messenger Web Centre.”).
108
E-mail from 이병건[Lee Byung-Geon], an administrative officer in charge of the Microsoft case in
the KFTC, to the author (Nov. 20, 2006, 00:38:03 PST) (on file with the Journal).
109
Id.
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to bear responsibility for legal consequences arising from those pre-installed
software.110 In other words, if the pre-installed software malfunctions or is
involved in a legal complaint concerning copyrights or intellectual property
rights, Microsoft would also be heavily obliged to fix such problems.111 To
clear up those potential legal problems, Microsoft and OEMs would have to
thoroughly examine the source codes of the software that would be loaded to
Windows. Such a rigorous inspection could be expected to burden both
Microsoft and OEMs with high additional costs.112 At this point, because the
KFTC took into account such negative impacts on the OEMs, and not on
Microsoft, it was reluctant to adopt the pure must-carry remedy. 113
Moreover, Microsoft’s competing software makers expressed
concerns about exposing their software’s source codes to Microsoft and
other third parties through the process of inspections as described above.114
Also, they worried that if Microsoft was given discretionary power in
designing the must-carry version of Windows, the pre-installed software
could be arbitrarily modified.115
Computer manufacturers were also reluctant to follow the pure mustcarry remedy.116 If they sell computers designed for the must-carry version
of Windows, they will have to provide after-sale service on the pre-installed
programs.117 Such additional after-sale service obligations would burden the
manufacturers with incremental costs. Due to the highly competitive nature
of computer markets, such increased costs would in turn significantly
compromise the manufacturers’ profit margins. Therefore, even though a
pure must-carry option provides consumers with full equal opportunities to
use competing products, the KFTC decided not to impose such a remedy on
Microsoft.118
Yet the KFTC explained that although the pure must-carry remedy is
excluded, the “Media/Messenger Centre” will have a very similar effect as
the must-carry alternative.119 Because of the ubiquitous high-speed internet
connections in Korea, 120 such link icons on the screen are likely to give
110
111
112
113

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See also another e-mail from Lee Byung-Geon (Feb. 6, 2007, 06:05:25 PST) (on file with the

Journal).
114
115
116
117
118
119
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Don Kirk, Technology; In Korea, Broadband Is Part of the Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001,
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Windows users a similar impression and recognition like those of preinstalled software.121
In sum, among the various remedial options available, the must-carry
requirement against Microsoft would be the most effective way to give
Windows users fully equal access to the competing products. But as
discussed above, practical difficulties exist in providing equal accessibility
through requiring pre-installation of the competing software. Thus, the
“Media/Messenger Center,” which is expected to create similar (but still not
equal) accessibility as the must-carry obligation, is an appropriate alternative
as the next best option for the KFTC.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Because the remedy phase of an antitrust case is crucial, 122 it is
worthwhile to evaluate the effectiveness of the remedy adopted after the
finding of antitrust violations. In the U.S., the function of the remedy (in
civil cases) is to “restore the market to the condition it would have enjoyed
had there been no violation, and to deter future violation.” 123 Such a
remedial purpose seems consistent with that of Korea and Europe, because
the competition laws of those countries share a similar underlying goal: the
protection of fair market competition.124
Microsoft’s tying practices in relation to its operating systems and
applications have been condemned as a violation of antitrust laws in various
parts of the world. While courts have ordered diverse remedies against
Microsoft, such measures have not effectively eliminated the unfair
competitive advantage that Microsoft enjoys. The D.C. District Court’s
settlement measure requiring hiding icons without code removal was not a
meaningful measure to mitigate the distribution disadvantage of Microsoft’s
competitors. On the other hand, while the E.C.’s mandatory versioning was
a more effective remedy than that of the U.S., it is still defective due to the
lack of different pricing between the bundled and unbundled versions. In
this regard, the KFTC’s idea of “Media/Messenger Centre” is the most
effective remedy so far because it lessens Microsoft’s relative advantage in
distribution obtained by bundling its application programs with Windows.

121

Id.
ELEANOR M. FOX ET AL., U.S. ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT, 186 (2nd ed. 2004).
123
Id.
124
Youngjin Jung, supra note 80, at 69; See also Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals
and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64
ANTITRUST L.J 443, 443 (1996).
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One might argue that the KFTC’s remedy is still unsatisfactory relief
to harmed competitors because it does not require Microsoft to pre-install
the competing products by default. In other words, the KFTC could impose
a must-carry obligation on Microsoft because such an obligation could
neutralize Microsoft’s ability to tie WMP and WM to Windows. However,
such a pure must-carry obligation may not have been able to survive the
potential legal and economic problems that would arise when the competing
software gets commingled with the codes of Windows. Therefore, the
KFTC’s “Media/Messenger Centre” holding appears to be the second-best
alternative to remedy Microsoft’s anticompetitive violations while
preserving as many aspects of the pure must-carry remedy as possible.
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KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION

PLENARY SESSION
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February 24, 2006
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2002 Kyung-Chok 0453, 2005 Kyung-Chok 0375
In the Matter of the Abuse of Market Dominant Position
of Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Korea
1. Steve Ballmer, Chief Executive Officer, Microsoft
Corporation, One Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA 98052,
United States
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Korea, 6th floor, Posco Center, 892 Daechi-dong,
Gangnam-gu, Seoul.
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Attorneys in charge: Jung Kyung-Taek, Ahn Jae-Hong,
Rim Yong
HOLDING125

1. TYING WINDOWS MEDIA SERVICE
A. Within 180 days of the notification date of this cease and desist order
(hereinafter referred to as “date of this order”), the examinees shall not tie
Windows Media Service (hereinafter referred to as “WMS”, including all
the programs that perform the same or equivalent functions; hereinafter
125

Translators’ Note: The translation for this article only includes the "Jumun" ("주문") part of the
whole opinion. Microsoft Decision, supra, note 3 at 1. In general, the "Jumun" means the text of a judicial
decision which briefly summarizes a legal determination and the remedies imposed in a case. In this case,
however, the “Jumun” only contains the remedies imposed against the examinee Microsoft. Here, I
translated the "Jumun" as “holding” in English, taking into consideration the characteristics and purpose of
the full opinion.
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the same shall apply) to the Windows Server Operating System (including
Windows Server Operating System, regardless of the names, which
examinees will develop and sell from now on, Windows Server 2003 and
all the other older versions).
(1) The Commission will determine the range of source codes and files
which shall not be included so as to unbundle WMS from the Windows
Server Operating System, within 60 days of the date of this order,
taking into account the examinees’ opinions.
(2) The examinees shall submit a list of the source codes of each
version and a detailed report of each file which cannot be included in
accordance with subsection (1) above in the Windows Server Operating
Systems that will be developed from now on, within 60 days before the
commencement of sale.
B. After 180 days of this order, the examinees shall sell and distribute
WMS in a way separate from Windows Sever Operating System, and
shall not perform any acts that might harm the separate sale and
distribution of WMS. Any of the following shall be prohibited:
(1) The act of providing Windows Server Operating System packages
which include a compact disk (hereinafter, referred to as “CD”) that
includes WMS or equivalent programs; or providing the service packs
or updates, which include WMS, of the Windows Server Operating
System.
(2) The act of providing WMS download link on Windows Server
Operating System, the subsequent service packs or the updates.
(3) The act of having display or advertisement that induces, or might
induce, installation or use of WMS in Windows Server Operating
System, the subsequent service packs or the updates.
(4) The act of setting up WMS as a default installation not through the
direct decision of users (including consumers, manufacturers and
distributors; hereinafter the same shall apply),
C. The examinees shall assure that the performance and stability of the
Windows Server Operating System which follows the measures of section
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A is not inferior to the version which does not follow the measures; and
that, when the source codes and files excluded under the measures of
section A get installed to the Windows Server Operating System, the
System shall perform as if it has originally built-in such codes and files.
D. In relationship with server manufacturers, the examinees shall not
perform any of the following:
(1) The act of trading on the conditions of providing, distributing,
renting, promoting, using, installing or supporting only WMS; the act
of providing economic or non-economic benefits such as payment in
return of such conditions, reducing the price of Windows Server
Operating System and creating favorable terms and conditions of
businesses.
(2) The act of retaliation, or giving notice of retaliation, regardless of
its forms thereof, such as reducing or suspending the offer of economic
or non-economic benefits for the reason that the server manufacturers
attempt to provide, distribute, rent, promote, use, install or support
other software which is competing with WMS.
2. TYING WINDOWS MEDIA PLAYER AND MESSENGER
A. After 180 days of the date of this order, the examinees shall not tie
Windows Media Player (hereinafter referred to as “WMP”; including its
successors and all of the examinees’ programs, regardless of their names,
which perform the same or equivalent functions of WMP) and Messenger
(Windows Messenger, MSN Messenger and all of the examinees’
programs, regardless of their names, which perform the same or
equivalent functions; hereinafter referred to as “the examinees’
Messenger”) to the Windows Personal Computer (hereinafter referred to
as “PC”) Operating System (including Windows XP, Windows Vista,
other older versions and every Windows PC Operating System, regardless
of its name, which examinees will develop and sell from now on; herein
after the same shall apply): hereinafter, referred to as “unbundled PC
Operating System.” However, apart from the foregoing remedies, if the
examinees follow the measures specified in section C below in regard to
the competing products, they may provide WMP and the examinees’
Messenger tied to the PC Operating System as currently provided
(hereinafter, referred to as “bundled PC Operating System”) in addition to
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the “unbundled PC Operating System.” Regarding the examinees’ certain
versions of the Operating System deemed to have had substantially low
market shares of less than 5 percent at the end of previous year, the
Commission may withdraw all or part of this order upon the examinees’
request after the date of this order, taking into account the degree of
competition restoration, the burden of examinees and their expected
position in the future market.
(1) As to “the unbundled PC Operating System,” the methods and
procedures set forth under section B below apply.
(2) As to the “bundled PC Operating system,” the methods and
procedures set forth under section C below apply.
B. The examinees shall be subject to the following when providing
“unbundled PC Operating System.”
(1) In order to provide “unbundled PC Operating System,” the
examinees are obliged to unbundle WMP and the examinees’
Messenger from the existing Windows PC Operating System.
(a) The Commission will determine the range of source codes and
files which shall not be included so as to unbundle WMP and the
examinees’ Messenger from Windows PC Operating System, within
60 days of the date of this order, taking into account the examinees’
opinions.
(b) The examinees shall submit a list of the source codes of each
version and a detailed report of each file which cannot be included
under subsection (1) above, within 60 days before the
commencement of sale.
(2) After 180 days of this order, the examinees shall sell and distribute
WMP and the examinees’ Messenger in a way that is separate from the
“unbundled PC Operating System,” and shall not perform acts that
might harm the separate sale and distribution of WMP and the
examinees’ Messenger. Any of the following shall be prohibited:
(a) The act of providing the “unbundled PC Operating System”
packages which include a CD that includes WMP or the examinees’
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Messenger or equivalent programs; or providing the service packs or
updates, which include WMP or the examinees’ Messenger, of the
“unbundled PC Operating System.”
(b) The act of providing a download link for WMP and the
examinees’ Messenger in the “unbundled PC Operating System” or
its service packs or updates.
(c) The act of having display or advertisement that induces, or might
induce, installation or use of WMP or the examinees’ Messenger in
the “unbundled PC Operating System,” its service packs or updates.
(d) The act of setting up as a default installation, WMP, digital
audio or video format which the examinees possess, Digital Rights
Management (hereinafter referred to as “DRM”), codec, the
examinees’ Messenger or communication protocols for the use of the
Messenger in the “unbundled PC Operating System,” its service
packs or updates, not through the direct decision of users.
(3) The examinees shall assure that the performance and stability of
the “unbundled PC Operating System” which follows the measures of
subsection (1) above is not inferior to the version which does not
follow the measures; and that, even when the source codes and files
excluded under the measures of subsection (1) above get installed to the
“unbundled PC Operating System,” the System shall perform as if it
has originally built-in such codes and files.
C. The examinees shall be subject to the following when providing
“bundled PC Operating System”:
(1) Examinees shall install and operate “Media Player Centre” and
“Messenger Centre” (hereinafter referred to as “Media/Messenger
Center” when indicating both) in the “bundled PC Operating System”
according to each of the following; and the Media/Messenger Centre
shall provide users with substantial opportunities to download
competing products as required below.
(a) The icons and menus of Media/Messenger Centre shall be placed
where users can readily recognize, for example, the program menu
list or the desktop of the “bundled PC Operating System”; they shall

398

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 16 NO. 2

maintain the same or similar sizes and forms as those of
corresponding menus or icons (hereinafter referred to as “icons”) of
WMP and Windows Messenger.
(b) The Media/Messenger Centre, when users click on its icons,
shall include, among the streaming media players or instant
messengers (hereinafter, referred to as “messengers”) provided in
this country, the streaming media players from the Commissionrecognized businesses possessing the original technology; 126 and
icons from businesses having more than 5 percent of market shares
in net users per month as reported by the Commission-recognized
market research groups as of the date of this order; and icons of
“Media Player Web Centre” and the “Messenger Web Centre”
(hereinafter, referred to as “Media/Messenger Web Centre” when
indicating both) of the said businesses.
(c) The examinees shall connect the users to the said businesses or
the Web Centre’s websites so that the users can download desired
programs, when the users click on the icons of each program which
appear following the clicks on Media/Messenger Centre, or when the
users click on the icons of Media/Messenger Web Centre.
(d) When the businesses providing streaming media players or
messengers do not want to have their products included in the
Media/Messenger Centre, or the businesses demand substantially
unfair conditions such as requesting the payment in return or waiving
the responsibility of a surety, the examinees may request the
Commission to exclude the products from the Media/Messenger
Centre. In that case, the Commission may remove from the
Media/Messenger Centre even the products which are subject to
C(1)(b) of this section.
(e) After 1 year of this order, the Commission, upon the interested
parties’ request, may change the list of the media players and
messengers which shall be included in the “Media/Messenger
Centre,” taking into account the fluctuations of the market conditions.
126

The “original technology” is the term translated from “Won Cheon Gi Sul (원천기술).” Microsoft
Decision, supra, note 3 at 6 (“Won Cheon Gi Sul” is the term representing a technology which is regarded to
be original and first, without rivals. Sometimes, a patent acquisition determines whether one has the
original technology.).
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(f) Within 60 days of this order, the Commission shall determine the
range of streaming media players and messengers of which icons are
placed in the Media/Messenger Centre as well as the details of the
registration process and the operation of the Centre.
(2) As to Windows Vista (including every Windows PC Operating
System and its older versions which are sold as successors to Windows
XP, regardless of their names; hereinafter the same shall apply), the
examinees shall provide devices as follows for users to readily
download the streaming media players of other businesses which have
their own formats, when providing the “bundled PC Operation
System.”
(a) The examinees shall allow other Commission-recognized
businesses possessing basic technology to register their own formats
in accordance with the reasonable conditions set by the examinees
upon the Commission’s approval. If there is concern for disclosing
the source codes or other trade secrets of the businesses due to the
registration of their formats, the Commission shall determine the
measures to resolve the concern taking into account those
businesses’ opinions.
(b) When users want to play the Internet streaming contents or the
contents saved in the users’ hard-disk or CD ROM written in
different formats, and when the software that can play such contents
is not registered in the Windows PC Operating System, the
examinees shall connect the users to those media player businesses
so as to download the software needed to play those contents.
(c) Within 90 days of the date of this order or the date of launching
Windows Vista’s beta version, whichever is later, the examinees
shall disclose on the Internet a detailed document describing the
instructions and the contents of the devices which the examinees will
provide.
(3) From the point when the examinees are commercially and
technically able to begin mutual communication with other messenger
businesses under reasonable terms and conditions, the examinees shall
make good faith efforts to create an agreement (hereinafter, referred to
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as “mutual compatibility agreement”) on which domestic MSN users
can mutually communicate with the users of other messengers.
(a) Within 120 days of this order, so as to make a mutual
compatibility agreement, the examinees shall begin to consult with
messenger businesses possessing more than 5 percent of market
shares in net users per month as reported by the Commissionrecognized market research groups as of the date of this order.
However, the examinees may not consult with those who manifest
intent not to make the mutual compatibility agreement.
(b) Every 6 months after the beginning of consultation for the
mutual compatibility agreement, the examinees shall report to the
Commission the progress of the consultation.
(4) The examinees shall assure that the performance and stability of
the “bundled PC Operating System” which follows the measures of
subsection (1) or (3) is not inferior to the version which does not follow
the measures.
D. Within 180 days of this order, the examinees themselves, or through a
third party, shall provide the users of the existing Windows PC Operating
System, which is not subject to Section A or B above, with service packs
which include products competing with WMP or the examinees’
messengers; and shall provide, through Windows updates (including
updates for Windows PC Operating System, WMP and Windows
messengers), the Media/Messenger Centre as set forth in C(1) above.
(1) When the service packs are distributed in a form of CD, the
programs which will be included in the CD shall be determined in
accordance with C(1)(b) above.
(2) Taking into account the examinees’ opinions, the Commission
shall determine the details as to the enforcement of this order such as
the range of supports and surety responsibilities of each business which
manufactures the said CD and provides the programs in the CD.
(3) As to the updates in accordance with the subsection (1) above, the
examinees shall announce the fact that they distribute the CDs at their
own expense and that any users who want the CDs may apply for them;
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and shall provide the CDs to the applicants for free within 1 year of this
order.
E. The examinees shall not tie WMP or the examinees’ Messenger to the
examinees’ other products which have more than 50 percent of national
market shares in sales as of the date of this order, such as Microsoft
Office, Microsoft Word, Microsoft PowerPoint and Microsoft Excel; and
shall not perform other conduct which corresponds to such tying. The
specific ranges of the examinees’ other products shall be determined by
the Commission within 90 days of this order.127
F. Via the Microsoft Developer Network (hereinafter, referred to as
“MSDN”), the examinees shall provide PC manufacturers (including
distributors; hereinafter, the same shall apply), related hardware
businesses (meaning independent hardware businesses which develop PCs
bundled with Windows PC Operating System or the hardware which is
included or used with server computers that carry server operating
systems within the country; hereinafter, the same shall apply), software
developers (meaning businesses other than the examinees which develop
or sell software products within the country; hereinafter, the same shall
apply), the Internet service providers (meaning businesses which provide
the Internet connection services to the domestic consumers, whether or
not they posses their own contents; hereinafter, the same shall apply) and
the Internet contents businesses (meaning domestic businesses which
provide contents to the Internet users within the country by running
websites; hereinafter, the same shall apply) with the following: the
Application Programming Interfaces (meaning interfaces [including
related callback interfaces] which WMP and Windows messengers make
calls to so as to be given services from the Windows PC Operating
System; hereinafter, referred to as “API”), which WMP and Windows
messengers use in order to interconnect and operate themselves with the
Windows PC Operating System, and related documents (meaning all the
information about identification and direction of APIs which is necessary
for those who have common knowledge on the related field to effectively
use the APIs) for the purpose of such interconnection and operation. The
APIs and the related documents shall be as accurate and specific as the
APIs which are ordinarily made public in MSDN by the examinees; and
127
This section has been withdrawn as a result of Microsoft’s appeal brought to the Commission. On
June 16, 2006, the Commission published a ruling which specified that withdrawal. In the Matter of the
Appeal from Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Korea, supra note 4 at 1.
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shall be so prepared that users who have ordinary knowledge and
capability regarding the industry have no difficulty in using them. The
information made public pursuant to this order shall be released until the
final beta release of each product if the new main versions of WMP and
Windows messengers are launched; either until more than 150,000 copies
of beta versions are distributed or until the same number of copies are
provided to the paid MSDN users, if the new version of Windows PC
Operating System is launched.
G. In relationship with PC manufacturers, software developers, hardware
businesses, the Internet service providers or the Internet contents
businesses (hereinafter, all referred to as “PC manufacturers”), the
examinees shall not perform any of the following:
(1) The PC manufacturers’ acts of trading on the conditions of
providing, distributing, renting, promoting, using, installing or
supporting only WMP, the examinees’ media formats, DRM, codec, the
examinees’ messengers (hereinafter, all referred to as “WMP and the
like”); or their acts of providing economic or non-economic benefits
such as payment in return of such conditions, reducing the price of the
Windows PC Operating System, creating favorable terms and
conditions of businesses.
(2) The examinees’ acts of retaliation, or giving notice of retaliation,
regardless of its forms thereof, such as reducing or suspending the offer
of economic or non-economic benefits for the reason that the PC
manufacturers attempt to provide, distribute, rent, promote, use, install
or support other software which is competing with WMP and the like.
3. THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THIS ORDER AS TO TIME AND
TERRITORY
A. This order shall apply to all of the Windows Server Operating Systems
and Windows PC Operating Systems which the examinees provide in
Korea. However, even if those products are provided within the country,
this order shall not apply if it is evident that they will be exported to other
countries.
B. This order shall remain in force for 10 years after the date of this order.
However, the examinees may annually request the Commission to review
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this order after 5 years of the date of this order.
(1) The Commission, upon the examinees’ request, may review the
change of the market conditions, the status of competition and the like;
and if a substantial improvement of the competition in the relevant
market is recognized in the review as a result of the effective
enforcement of this order, the Commission may withdraw or change all
or part of this order.
(2) The effect of a withdrawal or change under subsection (1) above
does not affect the examinees’ conduct performed prior to the
withdrawal or change.
4. As to the enforcement of this order, the Commission shall determine the
details to which this order does not specify within 120 days of the date of
this order, taking into account the examinees’ opinions.
5. To determine specific technical measures necessary to enforce this order
and ensure effective compliance with the order, the Commission may
appoint a “Supervisory Board.” The Board’s organization and the scope of
its duties shall be determined by the Commission.
6. The Commission, upon the examinees’ request, may change the period of
compliance if there is a reasonable ground.
7. When the Commission forms the measures taking into account the
examinees’ opinions, they must cooperate with the Commission in good
faith; if the examinees do not cooperate or submit false materials in violation
of the principle of good faith, the Commission may waive the process of
opinion collection set forth in this order.
8. The examinees must pay to the National Treasury the surcharges
specified under each of the following.
A. Amount of Payment: a total of 32.49 billion won (27.23 billion won
from Microsoft Corporation and 5 billion won from Microsoft Korea).
(1) For Tying WMS
(a) Examinee Microsoft Corporation: 626 million won
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(b) Examinee Microsoft Korea: 1.667 billion won
(2) For Tying WMP and the examinees’ messengers
(a) Examinee Microsoft Corporation: 26.604 billion won
(b) Examinee Microsoft Korea: 3.593 billion won
B. Payment Due: Within the period (60 days) specified in the payment
notice.
C. Place to Pay: The Bank of Korea National Treasury Receipt Agency or
a post office.

